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Ten years ago, privilege and protections surrounding peer review,
credentialing, event investigations, quality assurance, and risk
management enjoyed by Florida health care providers fell victim to
political feuding and maneuvering when medical malpractice trial
lawyers clashed with Florida's physicians, causing the loss of long-held
statutory protections. A constitutional ballot measure initiated by a
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manufactured grass-roots public interest group, or "Astroturf'
organization, effected an unnecessary and rash public policy change
never actually envisioned or sought out by Floridians. A 2013 survey of
Florida hospital risk managers provides an updated look at how this
contrived ballot measure, commonly known as "Amendment 7," initiated
a decade-long erosion of Florida's hospitals' and physicians' selfpolicing protections and how it continues to be misrepresented and
manipulated by the trial bar today.
INTRODUCTION

On November 2, 2004, Floridians fell victim to a well-orchestrated
and deceptive "trick play" in the volatile game of medical malpractice
tort reform. This scheme enlisted the help of unwitting Florida voters who
likely assumed they were advancing a consumer information initiative,
but instead they were being duped by a very narrow special interest group
into a reckless undermining of patient safety.
Through a contrived grass-roots or "Astroturf ' " organization called
"Floridians for Patient Protection" and the expenditure of millions of
dollars, the Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers (AFTL), Florida's
plaintiff trial lawyers' group 2 took advantage of the state's ballot
initiative process to advance a self-preserving and self-serving business
strategy. In an attempt to respond tactically to Florida's physicians
seeking restrictions on lawyers' fees in medical malpractice cases, AFTL
composed a state constitutional amendment entitled the "Patients' RightTo-Know About Adverse Medical Incidents" which came to be known
by its ballot number, "Amendment 7.''3 The fallout of this tactic was that,
by passing Amendment 7, voters naively caused serious damage to
Florida's statutory self-regulation protections which had been
1. The term "Astroturf' is used to describe the practice of disguising the patrons of a
political, marketing, or public relations message to give the false impression that the message
came from a legitimate grass-roots organization. By withholding information such as its true
source of funding, the Astroturf organization can mimic the believability of an entity that stemmed
from an unplanned expression of public opinion. Jonathan C. Zellner, Note, Artificial Grassroots
Advocacy and the Constitutionalityof LegislativeIdentificationand Control Measures,43 CONN.
L. REv. 357, 361-63 (2010). Four-term U.S. Senator from Texas, Lloyd Bentsen, is often credited
with coining the term. In 1985, while complaining about the "mountain of cards and letters" he
received in support of an insurance law provision, Bentsen is said to have quipped: "A fellow
from Texas can tell the difference between grassroots and Astroturf." Alex Wade, Good andBad
Reviews: The Ethical Debate Over 'Astroturfing,' GuARDIAN (Jan. 9, 2011), http://www.the
guardian.com/media-tech-law/astroturfing-posting-fake-reviews
2. This group has since changed its name to the Florida Justice Association. Who We Are,
FLORIDA JUSTICE ASSOCIATION, https://www.floridajusticeassociation.org/index.cfm?pg=Who
WeAre (last visited Sept. 21, 2014).

3. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 22.
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legislatively enacted and judicially enforced for over thirty years.4
A decade later, many in the plaintiff's bar are still misrepresenting the
retaliatory, self-serving original purpose behind Amendment 7. Citing the
fact that the misrepresented amendment was passed by Florida's voters,
some plaintiffs trial lawyers continue to perpetuate the myth that
Amendment 7 was a true consumer information ballot measure brought
by an actual progressive, grass-roots consumer group.
This Article will detail the original intent behind Amendment 7 by
reviewing the factual history of how it was invented by trial lawyers,
maneuvered onto the 2004 ballot, and used to finagle Florida voters into
making it law. The results of a 2013 survey sent to Florida hospital risk
managers, the professionals who are primarily responsible for handling
litigation document requests under Amendment 7, will be examined to
illustrate the Amendment's non-use as a consumer information tool for
making health care decisions. The survey provides evidence that the
Amendment is first and foremost used as a malpractice litigation tool by
plaintiff trial lawyers seeking previously undiscoverable but leverageable
evidence to force more favorable settlements. A call for action in the
name of public health and patient safety is made to eliminate this reckless
and unwarranted amendment to Florida's State Constitution.
I. THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE FEUD AND THE CONSTANT
BATTLE OVER NON-ECONOMIC DAMAGES

To better appreciate how something as reasonless and unwarranted as
the enactment of Amendment 7 could come to pass, it must be understood
that Florida's plaintiff trial lawyers and physicians have been engaged in
something akin to a blood feud over medical malpractice tort reform for
the past forty plus years.5 Like most feuds, it has been fueled by both
parties' intense feelings of insult and resentment, and long-running cycles
of vengeful retribution. 6 Millions of dollars have been spent by both sides
fighting this feud,7 and even more words and opinions have been
4. Comprehensive Medical Malpractice Reform Act, FLA. STAT. § 769.133 (1975).
5. See generally Michelle M. Mello et al., The New Medical MalpracticeCrisis,348 NEw
ENG. J. MED. 2281, 2281-83 (2003).
6. Andrew Jay McClurg, Fight Club: Doctors vs. Lawyers -A Peace Plan GroundedIn
Self-Interest. 83 TEMP. L. REV. 309, 310-30 (2011).
7. For example, in 1988, it was estimated that $14 million was spent in total by lawyers
and physicians on the 1988 constitutional amendment seeking to cap non-economic damages.
Diane Hirth, Big Money FinancesAmendment 10 Lawyers, Doctors Dig Deep to Support Fight
on Jury Awards, SUN SENTINEL (Fla.), Nov. 6, 1988, http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/1988-1 106/news/8803050250 1_law-firms-amendment-limit. Over $27.7 million in contributions were
made to FPP to support its efforts in the 2004 ballot initiatives. See CampaignFinanceActivity of
Floridiansfor PatientProtectionin 2004, FLORIDA DIVISION OF ELECTIONS, election.dos.state.fl.
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generated, arguing every conceivable angle of the malpractice tort reform
debate. Both sides have formed political action committees and engaged8
in relentless lobbying for and against medical malpractice tort reform.
Four separate government "task forces" have been formed in the last forty
years to resolve Florida's recurring medical malpractice "crises," none of
which led to any permanent resolution. 9 Endless tinkering with medical
malpractice statutes has resulted in compromise laws that either have no
appreciable effect on the issues, or in litigation that eventually caused the
statutory reforms to be undone by the courts. 10 Both parties have
us/initiatives/initiativelist.asp (last visited Sept. 22, 2014) [hereinafter DIVISION OF ELECTIONS]
(select "2004" under "year" and "passed/defeated" under "status," and then select "run query,"
select "Floridians for Patient Protection" under "sponsor," select "Campaign Finance Activity").
8. In 1984, the proposed amendment to the Florida Constitution was titled "Citizen's
Rights in Civil Actions," which aimed to place a cap of$ 100,000 on non-economic damages. See
Evans v. Firestone, 457 So. 2d 1351, 1353 (Fla. 1984). In response, the "Floridians Against
Constitutional Tampering" or "FACT" was formed to oppose the proposed amendment. See ExJustice Karl to HeadDrivefor Lawsuit Amendment, OCALA STAR-BANNER, Sept. 20 1984, at 5B.
In 1988 the FMA collaborated with a coalition of businesses and other groups called the "Florida
Committee for Liability Reform." See Alex Beasley, Attorneys FightPlan to Limit Liability Suits,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, Sept. 15, 1988, http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/19880915/news/0070040
289_1_liability-florida-alert. In turn, AFTL created ALERT 88. Steve Masterson, then the
Executive Director of AFTL, also served as the ALERT 88 chairman and general counsel. See
Joe Bizzaro, Alert '88 defends its ads attacking Amendment 10, FLA. BAR NEWS, Oct. 15, 1988,
available at legacy.library.ucsf.edu/documentStore/c/c/r/ccr47bOO/Sccr47b00.pdf; Barbara J.
Durkin, Seminars Prep Doctors for Voter Campaign, SUN SENTINEL (Fla.), Sept. 11, 1988,
http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/1988-091 1/news/8802220274 1 doctors-steve-masterson-florid
a-trial-lawyers; Jim Talley, MalpracticePrincipalsProtecting TheirAssets, SUN SENTINEL (Fla.),
July 19, 1987, http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/1987-07-19/business/8703010156_l_malpracticeinsurance-medical-malpractice-malpractice-victims. As discussed later in this Article, AFTL has
also formed the political action committees "Alert 2002" and "Floridians for Patient Protection."
The FMA created "Citizens for a Fair Share." Sunshine, Ballots, and Lawyers, CENTER FOR
INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM (Feb. 12, 2004), http://www.cfiforg/htdocs/legislativeissues/federal_
issues/hotissues in congress/legalreform/fma.htm.
9. In 1975, The Florida Legislature assembled a legislative task force that assembled and
forwarded recommendations that led to the passage of the Comprehensive Medical Malpractice
Reform Act provided in FLA. STAT. § 769.133 (1975) See Jessica Fonseca-Nader, Note and
Comment, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 551, 553-54 (1996). In 1984, Governor Bob Graham created a
task force on medical malpractice which led to the passage of the Comprehensive Medical
Malpractice Reform Act of 1985. Gov.'s T.F. ON MED. MALPRACTICE, REPORTS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS, TOWARD PREVENTION AND EARLY RESOLUTION 17 (Apr. 1985); H.R. 1352
(Fla. 1985). A third task force was established under the Tort Reform and Insurance Act of 1986.
Smith v. Dep't of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080, 1083, 1086 (Fla. 1987). In 2002, Governor Jeb Bush
assembled the "Governor's Select Task Force on Healthcare Professional Liability Insurance"
discussed later in this Article. FLA. S. COMM. ON HEALTH REG., INTERIM PROJECT REPORT 2008136: FLORIDA PATIENT SAFETY CORPORATION 1-2 (2007), available at http://archive.flsenate.gov/
data/Publications/2008/Senate/reports/interimreports/pdf/2008-136hr.pdf.
10. See Aldana v. Holub, 381 So. 2d 231, 238 (Fla. 1980) (striking down the provision in
Fla. Stat. § 768.44 requiring a claimant to submit any action before a mediation panel before filing
lawsuit as violative of the Due Process Clause of U.S. Constitution and the Florida Constitution);
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perpetuated this feud, and it shows no signs of relenting, as evidenced by
reactions to the Florida Supreme Court's 2014 opinion in McCall v.
United States 1 striking the statutory cap on wrongful death noneconomic
damages in medical negligence cases enacted by the Florida legislature
in 2003 that precipitated the advent of Amendment 7.12
At its core, the feud is about liability insurance premiums. Physicians
blame trial lawyers for Florida's exorbitant medical malpractice
premiums, and lawyers blame the high premiums on the insurance
industry's business cycle fluctuations.13 From the physician perspective,
the holy grail of the medical malpractice tort reform feud has been
establishing caps on non-economic damages. Seeking to emulate the
success of California's Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act
(MICRA) 14 in limiting liability insurance premium increases by capping
non-economic damages, Florida physicians have repeatedly lobbied the
Smith, 507 So. 2d at 1088, 1095 (Fla. 1987) (finding that the non-economic damage caps in the
Tort Reform and Insurance Act of 1986 of $450,000 unconstitutionally denied claimants access
to the courts under Article I, Section 21 of the Florida Constitution). The Court found that no
reasonable alternative remedy or commensurate benefit was offered by the statutory caps and that
there had not been a showing by the legislature that the caps were a result of "an overpowering
public necessity for the abolishment of such right, and no alternative method of meeting such
public necessity can be shown." Id. at 1089. In its opinion, the Court stated that Florida's
Constitution would need to be amended to allow for such caps to remain. Id. at 1099 (Ehrlich, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part.).
11. In March 2014, the Florida Supreme Court ruled that statutory caps enacted in 2003 on
non-economic damages violated the equal protection provision of the Florida Constitution in
wrongful death cases. See Estate of McCall v. United States, 134 So. 3d 894, 916 (Fla. 2014). The
Court rejected the statistical evidence of a medical malpractice insurance "crisis" and purported
effect on health care availability relied upon by the Florida legislature in 2003. Id at 906-07.
12. Id.
13.

See FLA. H.R., SELECT COMM. ON MED. LIAB. INS. REP. 14 (2003).

The causes of past and current insurance crises are hotly debated. However, they
generally fall into two categories. One suggested cause is underwriting loss due
to increases in the frequency (number) of claims, increases in the severity (size)
of claims, and uncertainty due to the "long tail" (claims against a single year's
policy are not all made and paid until a certain number of years later). The other
suggested cause for the crises is investment loss due to a reduced rate of return
on insurance company investment of premiums due to lower interest rates and
the declining stock market.
Id
14. California's Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act of 1975 (MICRA), 1975 Cal.
Stat. 3949, is thought to have been a key influence on liability reform advocates during this period.
See Leonard J. Nelson III et al., Damages Caps in Medical Malpractice Cases, 85 MILBANK Q.,
259, 262-63 (2007). California caps noneconomic damages at $250,000 in malpractice cases with
no upward adjustment for inflation. Id. at 262. MICRA also provides offsets for collateral sources
of moneys received by the plaintiff such as health or disability insurance, periodic payouts of
future damages and places contingency fee limits on plaintiff attorneys. Id. at 263.

[Vol. 25

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OFLA WAND PUBLICPOLICY

Florida legislature for California-style caps.1 5 When legislative efforts
have either failed or were found to be unconstitutional by the Florida
Supreme Court, physicians have carried the feud to Florida's State
Constitution. Unlike other states that allow citizens to have a direct voice
in lawmaking by voting for initiatives that, essentially, create a statutory
law with the same force and effect of a bill passed by the state legislature,
Florida allows its state constitution to be directly amended by voters.
Similar to the U.S. Constitution, each State's Constitution is the supreme
law of the land, and no Florida statutory law can be enacted that
contravenes the provisions of Florida's State Constitution. 16 Twice
during the 1980s, physicians in Florida sought to have the Florida State
Constitution amended to require limits on malpractice awards.' 7 Each of
these efforts was vehemently fought by Florida trial lawyers. 18 The first
effort in 1984 failed to make the ballot. 19 The second attempt made the
ballot in 1988, but it did not pass.2"
A decade passed before any further energy was placed into reform
efforts. 21 Malpractice insurance rates decreased, and the overall number
of lawsuits was down, as was the number of paid claims against
physicians and the average awards collected by plaintiffs against

15. See Gov.'s T.F. ON MED. MALPRACTICE, supra note 9, at 21-22. See also FonsecaNader, supra note 9, at 553.
16. See FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 1. See also Mary Coombs, How Not to Do Medical
MalpracticeReform: A FloridaCase Study, 18 HEALTH MATRIX 373, 378-80 (2008) (analyzing
Florida's unique ballot initiative process).
17.
18.

See Gov.'s T.F. ON MED. MALPRACTICE, supra note 9, at 21-22.
Alex Beasley & Rosemary Goudreau, Interest Groups Stake Their Claims in Costly

Political Wars, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Apr. 13, 1986, http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/1986-041
3/news/0210320017 1 malpractice-law-malpractice-suits-doctors-and-lawyers; Donna O'Neal,
Amendment

10

Foes

Try

Shock

Treatment,

ORLANDO

SENTINEL,

Sept.

22,

1988,

http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/1988-09-22/news/0070130004_1_florida-medical-malpractic
e-amendment- 10.
19. See Gov.'s T.F. ON MED. MALPRACTICE, supra note 9, at 21. The Florida Supreme
Court found that the proposed amendment violated the single subject rule by including language
that eliminated the joint and several liability law then in place and by making changes to the
summary judgment process. Evans, 457 So. 2d at 1354. The language of Amendment 9 was also

found to misleading and defective and therefore did not appear on the ballot. Id. at 1355. Joint
and several liability was eventually repealed by the Florida Legislature. See FLA. STAT. § 768.81
(2011).
20.

Diane Hirth, Measure Prompts Confusion Doctors, Victims Join Amendment 10

Debate, SUN SENTINEL (Fla.), Oct. 30, 1988, available at http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/198810-30/news/8803030868 _ _florida-doctors-insurance-costs-medical-malpractice-cases; Florida
Civil Action Damages Limitations, Amendment 10 (1988), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/

FloridaCivilAction Damages-Limitations, Amendment_10_(1988)
2014).
21.

(last visited May 13,

JOHN C. HITr, Gov.'s T.F. ON HEALTHCARE PROF'L LIAB. INS. 54 (2003), available at

http://floridahealthinfo.hsc.usf.edu/GovTaskForceInsReform.pdf.
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physicians. 22 However, during the late 1990s and early 2000s, the
malpractice climate started to change. Premium rates began to rapidly
increase. For example, the U.S. General Accounting Office found that
between 1999 and 2002, Ob/Gyn physicians practicing in Miami-Dade
County saw their malpractice premiums increase by 43%, general surgery
by 75%, and internal medicine by 98%.23 For three years in a row, the
American Medical Association cited Florida as a crisis state with respect
to the effects medical malpractice jury awards and medical liability
insurance premiums were having on the practice of medicine. 24 The
Insurance Information Institute published a report that Florida doctors
were sued twice as often as their peers in other states. 25 From 2000 to
2002, median medical malpractice insurance premiums for Florida
providers increased 50.7% compared to a national median increase of
29.1%.26 A report commissioned by the Florida Hospital Association
concluded that the total amount of medical malpractice claims paid in
2000 was 150% higher than in 1991.27 Total indemnity payments in the
state of Florida for professional liability in 1975 were $10.2 million.28 By
2001, the total had swollen to $326 million, an increase of a whopping
3074%.29 A later detailed analysis of claims and litigation data during
2002 and 2003 indicated that the average yearly payout for closed claims
in Florida increased regardless of the severity of the alleged injury. 30 The
average of paid claims adjusted to the Consumer Inflation Index rose
from $176,603 in 1990 to $300,280 in 2003. 3 1 The feud was soon back
on, full strength.
22. Diane Hirth, Malpractice Crisis Eases Across State, SUN SENTINEL (Fla.), Oct. 30,
1989, http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/1989-10-30/news/8902070108_1_medical-malpractice-ma
lpractice-insurance-malpractice-lawsuits; Robert Pear, Insurers Reducing MalpracticeFees for
Doctors in US., N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1990, http://www.nytimes.com/1990/09/23/us/insurersreducing-malpractice-fees-for-doctors-in-us.html.
23.

Excerpts from Medical Malpractice and Access to Health Care (GA0-03-836),

http://www.policyalmanac.org/health/archive/medicalmalpractice.
shtml (last updated Aug. 2003).
24. See HITT, supra note 21, at 3, 60.
25. See Robert P. Hartwig & Claire Wilkinson, Medical Malpractice Insurance, INS.
ISSUES 1, 3 (2003).
26. David Dranove & Anne Gron, Effects of the Malpractice Crisis on Access to and
Incidence offHigh-Risk Procedures:Evidencefrom Florida,24 HEALTH AFF. 809 n.6 (2005).
27. FLORIDA HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION & MILLIMAN, USA, INC., MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
ALMANAC OF POL'Y ISSUES,

ANALYSIS 4 (2002).

28. Robert E. Cline & Carl J. Pepine, Medical Malpractice Crisis: Florida's Recent
Experience, 109 CIRCULATION 2936, 2936 (2004), availableathttp://circ.ahajoumals.org/content/
109/24/2936.
29. Id.
30. Neil Vidmar et al., Uncovering the "Invisible" Profile of Medical Malpractice
Litigation: Insightsfrom Florida,54 DEPAUL L. REv. 315, 355 (2005).
31. Id. at 342.
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In response to the hue and cry of the medical establishment, Governor
Jeb Bush created, in August 2002, the "Governor's Select Task Force on
Healthcare Professional Liability Insurance" 32 with the ultimate goal of
"protecting Floridians' access to high-quality and affordable
healthcare."33 The 2002 Task Force was the Governor's third task force
and the fourth overall governmental task force brought together to deal
with Florida's continually defective medical malpractice environment
since 1974.34 The Task Force was made up of presidents and trustees of
Florida universities, including Donna Shalala, President of the University
35
of Miami and eight-year U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services.
In its 379-page January 2003 main report and thirteen volumes of meeting
transcripts, the 2002 Task Force satirically commented that it was "dja
vu all over again," and that the problem they were asked to confront had
only compounded.36 In fact, the 2002 Task Force bitingly stated that all
of Florida's previous efforts to
eliminate the state's medical malpractice
37
unsuccessful:
been
had
crisis
Since 1975, Florida has implemented (or attempted to implement)
numerous alternatives to the cap on non-economic damages and
the other reforms recommended in this Report. None, alone or
together with the others, has solved the crisis of medical
malpractice insurance availability and affordability. Instead,
Florida's numerous attempts to solve this
problem are nothing
38
alternatives.
of
litany
failed
a
than
more
The Task Force detailed the elements that led to the crisis: medical
malpractice awards were increasing to record levels, claim frequency was
increasing, medical malpractice insurance premiums continued to rise
and were becoming unaffordable, many insurers and re-insurers had left
the medical malpractice insurance market, and coverage was on the verge
of becoming so unavailable at any price that some physicians and
hospitals were reducing the limits of their malpractice coverage or
foregoing insurance entirely. 39 The Task Force stated that "Florida
healthcare providers fear a bleak picture for Florida, but the Task Force
believes40it could get worse in the coming years if no corrective action is
taken.,
32.

HITT, supra note 21, at 2.

33. Id.

34. See id.
at 4.
35. Id. at 3.
36. Id.at 4.
37. Id. at 220.
38. Id. at219.
39. Seeid.at212.

40. Id.at211.
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In total, the Task Force made sixty recommendations in five areas of
reform: (1) health care quality, (2) physician discipline, (3) tort
compensation, (4) alternative dispute resolution, and (5) insurance code
reform. 4 1 Despite this breath of suggested remedies, the 2002 Task Force
made it very clear what they believed would be the only way Florida
could finally resolve the issue:
The Task Force is of the opinion that, while these comprehensive
reforms are important, the centerpiece and the recommendation
that will have the greatest long-term impact on healthcare provider
liability insurance rates, and thus eliminate the crisis of availability
and affordability of health care in Florida, is a $250,000 cap on
non-economic damages.42
[T]he Task Force finds and concludes that, without the
inclusion of a cap on potential awards of non-economic
damages in the package, no legislative reform plan can be
successful in achieving a goal of controlling increases in
healthcare 43
costs, and thereby promoting improved access to
healthcare.
In reaching this conclusion, the 2002 Task Force relied heavily on the
experience of California with its MRICA statutory caps and the findings
of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, the Congressional
Budget Office, and the Government Accounting Office. 44 The major
argument against the imposition of caps on non-economic damages used
by the Florida Supreme Court when it struck the cap provisions in the
Tort Reform and Insurance Act of 1986 was also addressed by the Task
Force, namely that caps limit the constitutional right of access to courts.45
The Task Force stated there was an overwhelming public necessity for
caps on awards of non-economic damages and that no alternative or less
onerous method for meeting the public necessity could be shown or
would be successful as required by the two4 prong
test established by the
6
White.
v.
Kluger
in
Court
Supreme
Florida
41. Id. at 336-45.
42. Id. at xvii.
43. Id. at 218.
44. "The Task Force finds that California has succeeded where Florida has failed at holding
down medical malpractice insurance premium rates." Id. at 193.
45.

FLA. STAT. § 768 (1985).

46.

281 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1973). In Kluger, the Court held that
[W]here a right of access to the courts for redress for a particular injury has been
provided by statutory law predating the adoption of the Declaration of Rights of
the Constitution of the State of Florida, or where such right has become a part of
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II. FLORIDIANS FOR PATIENT PROTECTION
Sensing that they were in for an all-engaging battle, Florida's plaintiff
trial lawyers drew upon valuable lessons that their California colleagues
had learned in the rough-and-tumble arena of California ballot initiative
politics; namely, that polling data indicated voters were not interested in
supporting ballot initiatives directly sponsored by trial lawyers.47 As a
result of this undeniable revelation, the California Trial Lawyers
Association began in the late 1980s to disguise their initiative campaigns
as originating from grass-roots consumer groups. 48 AFTL became keen
technique, and by the late 1990s were considered
students of this masking 49
masters of Astroturfing.
Their masterpiece of Astroturf management was the creation of
"Floridians for Patient Protection."5 In July 2002, AFTL Executive
Director Scott Carruthers filed documents with the State of Florida to
change the name of one of AFTL's existing political action committees
from "Alert 2002" to "Floridians for Patient Protection (FPP)."'51 AFTL
and FPP shared the same Tallahassee office address.5 2 Carruthers was
listed as the chairman of FPP.5 3 The 2001-02 AFTL President, Mark W.
Clark, and the 2002-03 President-elect, Howard Coker, were listed as
board members. 54 Huge55amounts of money started flowing into FPP from
Florida's trial lawyers.
the common law of the State pursuant to Fla. Stat. s 2.01, F.S.A., the Legislature
is without power to abolish such a right without providing a reasonable
alternative to protect the rights of the people of the State to redress for injuries,
unless the Legislature can show an overpowering public necessity for the
abolishment of such right, and no alternative method of meeting such public
necessity can be shown.
Id. See also Univ. of Miami v. Echarte, 618 So. 2d 189, 197-98 (Fla. 1993) (holding two statutes
with caps on non-economic damages in medical malpractice cases when the parties entered
binding arbitration were constitutional under the Kluger test).
47. Kenneth Reich, Insurers Demand Lawyers be Named in Initiative Ads, L.A. TIMES
(June 29, 1988), available at http://articles.latimes.com/1988-06-29/news/mn-50231 -triallawyers.
48. Id.
49. John Kennedy, Need a Grass-Roots Campaign? Industries Learn How to Hire One,
SUN SENTINEL (Fla.) (Oct. 28, 1996), available at http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/1996-1028/business/9610280244_llegislators-astroturfing-lobbyists.
50. Id.
51. Id
52. Statement of Organization of Political Committee, Alert 2002, Inc. (Apr. 29, 2002) (on
file with author).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55.

See Floridiansfor Patient Protection, NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON MONEY IN STATE

POLITICS, Top Industries, http://www.followthemoney.org/entity-details?eid=10239219

(last
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The next maneuver was to recruit a former client to nominally head
FPP, and Jacqueline Imbertson was selected for this role. Palm Beachbased AFTL member Ted Babbitt and his firm, Babbitt, Johnson,
Osborne & Le Clainche, represented Imbertson and her husband Edward
in a malpractice action against Palm Beach Gardens Community
Hospital, Inc. filed in 2000. During 2002, while the Governor's Select
Task Force on Healthcare Professional Liability Insurance was
conducting its malpractice analysis and physicians groups were holding
rallies to promote a non-economic damages cap, Imbertson began
appearing at FPP organized counter-rallies claiming to be the co-founder
of FPP. The Governor's Task Force even included Imbertson's testimony
as representing FPP in its report.56
During the summer of 2003, as the battles began heating up over
medical malpractice reform, Imbertson was still holding herself out to the
press as the founder of FPP, which she claimed was a grass-roots
organization made up of injured patients and their families who wanted
to improve patient safety.5 7 At this same time, FPP was running costly
state-wide television ads opposing tort reform proposals being considered
by the Florida Legislature.58 During a July 2003 press conference to
announce the running of the ads, Imbertson was confronted about who
was paying for the television time and how FPP was funded.59
Imbertson's response was unequivocal: "The group is supported by
private individuals and does not receive money from trial lawyers." 60 She
further said she did not know who had funded the airtime, and that FPP
did not disclose its donors. 61 The next day, after the news media and the
Florida Medical Association (FMA) challenged Imbertson's claims, both
Imbertson and AFTL were required
to admit that the ads and FPP were
62
in fact funded by trial lawyers.
visited Sept. 25, 2014).
56.
57.

SeeHirr,supranote21,at 159.
Nancy McVicar & Ana M. VaIdM-is, Hospitals Seek Rxfor Drug Mistakes Bar-Coding,

Computers, Help Cut Errors, SUN SENTINEL (Fla.) (July 7, 2003), available at http://articles.sunsentinel.com/2003-07-07/news/0307070161 l__patient-safety-nurses-miami-children-s-hospital.
58.

See John Snow, PatientAdvocate Group Admits Ties to Lawyers, JACKSONVILLE BUS.

J. (July 3, 2003), available at http://www.bizjournals.com/jacksonville/stories/2003/06/30/daily
22.html?page=all.
59.

See id.

60. Id.
61. See id.
62. See Allison North Jones, Lawyers Admit to Bankrolling Malpractice Ad, TAMPA TRiB.,
July 3, 2003. This was not the first time AFTL had been caught clandestinely using "victims" of
medical malpractice to lobby against tort refonn. In 1985, AFTL's executive director, Stephen
Masterson, initially denied and later admitted AFTL had funded lobbying trips to Tallahassee by
members of Florida Victims of Medical Malpractice, Inc. See Maya Bell, Lawyers GroupPays Bills
of Malpractice Lobbyists, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Apr. 28, 1985), available at http://articles.
orlandosentinel.com/1985-04-28/news/0290270259-1academy-masterson-medical-malpractice. As
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After Governor Jeb Bush called four separate special sessions to work
on medical malpractice reforms, the Florida Legislature passed Senate
Bill 2-D on September 15, 2003.63 Despite the lobbying efforts of the
FMA, the Florida Hospital Association (FHA), the Florida Osteopathic
Medical Association, insurance carriers, and the Florida Chamber of
Commerce, 64 the legislature rejected a hard $250,000 cap proposed by
the Task Force and instead ultimately adopted a system of six
progressive, variable caps of between $150,000 and $1.5 million
depending upon the type of defendant, setting, and injuries involved."
Leadership within the FMA felt that some republicans in the Florida
Senate had been under the heavy influence of the trial lawyers. 66 During
the full Senate's debate on the bill, the Chairman of the Judiciary
Committee, Alex Villalobos (R)67 stated that, based upon testimony
late as 2011, FPP was still representing itself as a legitimate grass-roots organization, as evidenced by
the "IdentitiesofAmici Curiaeand Statements of Interest" in an Amici Curiae brief filed in support
of Appellants seeking to overturn the statutory caps on damages in wrongful death actions. Brief of
Floridians for Patient Protection, Inc. & Florida Consumer Action Network, Inc. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Appellants, McCall v. United States, 134 So. 3d 894 (2014) (No. SCI 1-1148).
Floridians for Patient Protection, Inc. ("FPP") is a proactive organization of
medical malpractice and negligence victims and their families striving for
justice and change in Florida's medical care system and seeks to educate the
public and increase awareness regarding medical errors and the urgent need
for reforms in quality of care for all citizens.
Id.at *iv.
63. Leg. Ch. 2003416, 18th Leg., Spec. Sess. D (Fla. 2003).
64. The FMA and the FHA formed the Coalition to Heal Healthcare in Florida, which
successfully lobbied the Florida House of Representatives to include a $250,000 cap on noneconomic damages and most of the sixty recommendations of the Task Force. See Robert E. Cline
& Carl J. Pepine, Medical Malpractice Crisis: Florida'sRecent Experience, 109 CIRCULATION
2936, 2937 (2004).
65. See id.
66. See Coombs, supra note 16, at 381-82.
67. In his 2002 Senate campaign, Villalobos received over $26,000 in contributions from
lawyers and lobbyists (which included AFTL), by far his largest group of contributors. See
Showing Contributionsto Villalobos, JAlex, NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON MONEY INSTATE POLITICS,

http://www.followthemoney.org/show-me?c-t-eid=12999047&c-t-id 81780#[ {I lgro=d-cci (last
visited Sept. 26, 2014). Trial lawyers were given credit for assisting Villalobos in getting reelected in his tight Senate campaign race in 2006. See Aaron Deslatte, Analysis: Why -- and How
-- the Ball on CentralFlorida'sCommuter-Rail Projectwas Dropped,ORLANDO SENTINEL (May

4, 2008), available at http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2008-05-04/news/alcommuterO4_I_
commuter-rail-commuter-rail-csx-corp; Aaron Deslatte, Cash & Threats: How Trial Lawyers
Wielded New Powerto Help Block Commuter Rail, ORLANDO SENTINEL (May 20,2008), available
at http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2008-05-20/news/csx20 1 trial-lawyers-commuter-raillegislators. In 2010, Villalobos was the recipient of the Perry Nichols Award, "the highest honor
bestowed" by the AFTL. J. Alex Villalobos, MEYER, BROOKS, DEMMA AND BLOHIM, P.A.,
http://www.meyerandbrooks.com/JAV.htm (last visited May 14, 2014).
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before the Judiciary Committee, there had been no evidence of a crisis,
no evidence of significant increases in malpractice lawsuits, no evidence
of significant increases in malpractice claims payouts, and no testimony
to reduce malpractice premiums was to cap nonthat the only way 68
economic damages.

III. A PATIENT'S RIGHT TO KNOW

The leadership of the FMA was particularly incensed by AFTL's
powerful and decisive influence during the Senate Bill 2-D battle 69 and
therefore withdrew its support of Senate Bill 2-D, primarily based on the
lack of a hard $250,000 cap. 70 Two weeks after Senate Bill 2-D was
signed by Governor Bush, the FMA decided at their annual meeting to
pursue, for the third time in twenty years, yet another constitutional
amendment to rectify perceived disparities in the Florida medical
malpractice system. 7 1 However, instead of seeking to directly cap
damages as it had in the past, the physicians' initiative would take what
they thought would be a more palatable approach with voters and sought
to place restrictions on the contingency fees attorneys could collect in
medical malpractice actions.72 Under what would become known as
in all
Amendment 3, patients would receive 70% of the first $250,000
73
damages awarded and 90% of any award above $250,000.

AFTL members were immediately prepared to fight Amendment 3
with a pre-designed game plan based upon their experiences fighting the
FMA in the 1980s 74 and borrowing another page from the California trial
bar's playbook.75 For many years, California trial lawyers used the state's
ballot initiative system to place "counter" propositions in front of voters
in order to defeat or annul what they perceived as "anti-lawyer" or tort
reform initiatives. 76 Adapting this California concept for their situation in
68.

S. JOURNALNo. 2, 18th Leg., Spec. Sess. D, at 25 (Fla. 2003).

69. See Coombs, supra note 16, at 381-82.
70.

See Cathy Tokarski, MalpracticeReform Signed into Law in Florida:A Newsmaker

Interview with Robert Cline, AID, MEDSCAPE (Sept. 5, 2003), http://www.medscape.com/view
article/461009.
71.

Coralie Carlson, Doctors to Seek Awards Revision, LEDGER (Aug. 31, 2003, 2:24 AM),

http://www.theledger.com/article/20030831/NEWS/308310435.
72. See Coombs, supra note 16, at 382-83.
73.

See The Medical Liability Claimant's Compensation Amendment 03-34, FLORIDA

OF ELECTIONS http://election.dos.state.fl.us/initiatives/initdetail.asp?account-37767
&seqnum=l (last visited Sept. 27, 2014).
74. Id.
DIVISION

75. Mike Thomas, Doctors and Lawyers Should Call off the Dogs, ORLANDO SENTINEL
0 0
Apr. 1, 2004, available at http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2004-04-0 1/news/04 4 10124 1
lawyers-doctors-and-hospitals-florida-medical.
76. See Coombs, supra note 16, at 383 n.43. See also Dan Morain, Initiative Would

UNIVERSITY OFFLORIDA JOURNAL OFLA WAND PUBLICPOLICY

[Vol. 25

Florida, AFTL leaders carefully fashioned a set of retaliatory initiatives
to use as threats against the FMA and other groups traditionally aligned
with the FMA that might
have been seeking to upset the Florida
77
malpractice status quo.
Initially, AFTL planned four distinct retaliatory initiatives with FPP
as their Astroturf sponsor: "Requiring New Standards for Insurance
Rating," "Physicians Shall Charge the Same Fee for the Same Health
Care Service to Every Patient," "Prohibition of Medical License After
Repeated Medical Malpractice," and "Patients' Right to Know About
Adverse Medical Incidents., 78 It is important to note that neither AFTL,
FPP, nor any other group for that matter, had any actual political interest
in pursuing any of the proposed retaliatory amendments. At the time,
AFTL freely admitted the proposed amendments were simply being used
as threats to intimidate FMA and its allies into capitulation by
withdrawing Amendment 3. AFTL's professional leadership described
their tactics as "a policy similar to the mutual assured destruction
policy. '79 AFTL's Scott Carruthers 80 stated to the news media that the
lawyers felt compelled to retaliate after the FMA filed their attorney's fee
limiting amendment. 8'
Subsequent to crafting the retaliatory initiatives, AFTL began
applying pressure to keep the physicians' amendment off the November
2004 ballot. County and specialty medical societies were approached by
the trial lawyers to cajole them into breaking ranks with the FMA. 82 The
influential Associated Industries of Florida, the Florida Hospital
Association, the Florida Insurance Council, the Florida Chamber of
Commerce, and the Florida Association of Health Plans, all previous
supporters of the FMA's efforts, were confronted by AFTL and
83
subsequently either opposed Amendment 3 or declined to support it.
Associated Industries of Florida (AIF) and the Florida Insurance
Guarantee Lawyers Could Set Own Fees, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 24,

1996, available at

http://articles.latimes.com/1996-09-24/news/mn-470401

Kenneth

trial-lawyers;

Reich,

Lawyers Urged to Halt Ads Until After Election, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1988, available at

http://articles.latimes.com/1988-10-15/news/mn-3370_1-trial-lawyers.
77. See generally Coombs, supra note 16, at 383-84.
78.
79.

See DIVISION OF ELECTIONS, supra note 7.
Id. at 383.

80. Carruthers, who was with AFTL for over twenty years, was suspended, and then later
resigned in 2009 amid an internal investigation concerning a race-baiting campaign mailer issued
by the trial lawyers' group. Dara Kam, Trial Lawyers' Executive DirectorScott CarruthersQuits
over Racial Mailer, PALM BCH. POST (Oct. 27, 2009), http://postonpolitics.blog.palmbeachpost.

com/2009/1 0/27/trial-lawyers-executive-director-scott-carruthers-quits-over-racia-mailer/.
81.

Power Plays Unwelcome, SUN SENTINEL (Fla.) (Dec. 28, 2003), http://articles.sun-senti

nel.com/2 0 03-12-28/news/0312241191 1_florida-trial-lawyers-medical-malpractice-doctors.
82. See Coombs, supra note 16, at 384.
83. Id.
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Council (FIC) took active steps to persuade Florida's physicians not to
support the FMA amendment. The AIF sent a letter to over 40,000
doctors outlining its opposition to the amendment. 84 FIC's president
stated that the Florida Constitution needed to be protected from "groups
seeking to sidestep the 'checks and balances' found in the legislative
process." 85 To reward the defection of the other stakeholders, AFTL
withdrew the "Requiring New Standards for Insurance Rating" and the
"Physicians Shall Charge the Same Fee for the Same Health Care Service
to Every Patient" amendments, arguably the two with the greatest impact
on the business and insurance communities. 86 Interestingly, just six
months prior, the FIC had openly questioned the efficacy of Senate Bill
2-D by stating, "the Council is concerned that the insurance industry, the
healthcare community, and the consumer will not see significant relief
from this compromise while the trial lawyers continue their hold on the
system." 87 While AFTL's efforts were partially successful, the FMA
refused to negotiate with the trial lawyers whom they viewed as
"terrorists," 88 and repeatedly rejected AFTL's demands that the FMA
drop Amendment 3 in exchange for AFTL dropping their anti-doctor
amendments. 89 As a result, Amendments 3, 7, and 8 remained.
Both the FMA and AFTL were respectively able to gather a sufficient
number of voter signatures and all three initiatives were vetted and
approved by the Florida Supreme Court. 9° The game of wooing Florida
voters remained. Among the three initiatives, Amendment 7 was
particularly beguiling to an unwitting Florida voter. The ballot title and
summary read:
84. See Sample Letter from Jon L. Shebel, President & Chief Executive Officer, Associated
Industries of Florida Service Corporation, to Doctor (Jan. 30, 2004), available at
http://aif.com/information/2004/extra/drletter.pdf..
85. Id.
86. See Coombs, supra note 16, at 384 nn.45-46.
87. FloridalnsuranceCouncilStatement on Medical MalpracticeAgreement, ASSOCIATED
INDUSTRIES OF FLORIDA (Aug. 8, 2003), http://aif.comI/information/2003/sn030808c.html.Florida

Professional Insurance Corporation's CEO Bob White and FIC lobbyist Mark Delegal during
interviews conducted a few years later called the proposed AFTL amendments "'blackmail"' and
"'bullets and guns pointed at our heads."' See Coombs, supranote 16, at 384 n.50.
88. See Coombs, supra note 16, at 385 n.51. See also Mike Thomas, 3 Strikes for MDs?
Patients Will Be Losers, ORLANDO SENTINEL, June 6, 2004, availableat http://articles.orlando
sentinel.com/2004-06-06/news/0406060126_1_pacemakers-florida-medical-trial-lawyers.
89. See Thomas, supra note 75. See also AFTL Files Three Proposed Constitutional
Amendments, FLA. BAR (June 1, 2004), http://www.floridabar.org/DIVCOM/JN/jnnews01.ns7
8c9fl 3012b96736985256aa900624829/e77915b842abcdea85256ea000538bc2 !OpenDocument.
90. See generallyAdvisory Opinion to the Atty. Gen. (In re Med. Liab. Claimant's Comp.
Amendment), 880 So. 2d 675, 679 (Fla. July 15, 2004); Advisory Opinion to the Atty. Gen. (In
re Patients' Right to Know About Adverse Med. Incidents), 880 So. 2d 617, 623 (Fla. 2004);
Advisory Opinion to the Atty. Gen. (In re Pub. Prot. from Repeated Med. Malpractice), 880 So.
2d 667, 673 (Fla. 2004).
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"Patients' Right to Know About Adverse Medical Incidents."
Current Florida law restricts information available to patients
related to investigations of adverse medical incidents, such as
medical malpractice. This amendment would give patients the
right to review, upon request, records of health care facilities' or
providers' adverse medical incidents, including those which could
cause injury or death. Provides that patients' identities should not
be disclosed. 91
Positive polling numbers prior to the November election proved that
Amendment 7 used language that basically sold itself to the average
Florida voter. 92 The voting public was being offered a "right to know"
about something that heretofore had been withheld, and it was something,
based upon the language used, that could literally kill you. Never mind
that there is no explanation in the ballot summary as to why the Florida
Legislature had "restricted" disclosure of information related to adverse
medical incidents for the thirty years prior this initiative.93 Never mind
that no one had ever actually sought to directly repeal any of the
collection of statutes that make up Florida's health care self-regulation
protections. 94 Never mind that Florida courts had consistently upheld
these privileges and placed high social value on the need to maintain the
protections. 95 Amendment 7 was worded in such a way that anyone could
see himself or a loved one as a patient. It was ostensibly granting a right
of knowledge and protection for free.
Unfortunately, it did not require the voter to consider the negative
consequences of its passage, which would have been much more difficult
to articulate.96 Florida's news media, which had been chronicling the
battle between the physicians and trial lawyers, saw the purpose of all
three amendments as not to benefit Floridians, but rather to harm the
interest of a single opposing interest group. 97 In light of this estimation,

91. FLORIDA DIVISION OF ELECTIONS, Patients' Right to Know About Adverse Medical
Events Ballot 1, availableat http://election.dos.state.fl.us/initiatives/fultext/pdf/35169-3.pdf (last
visited Sept. 14, 2014) [hereinafter FLA. Div. OF ELEC.].

92.

See Coombs, supra note 16, at 386.

93. See FLA. STAT. § 769.133 (1975); supra note 11.
94. See FLA. Div. OF ELEC., supra note 91.
95. James C. Sawran & Robert C. Weill, Amendment 7: Will the Patients' Right-to-Know
Come at Too High a Price?, 24 TRIAL ADVOC. Q. 7, 10-12 (2005).

96. Opponents of Amendment 7 called it a 'wolf in sheep's clothing"' citing that its
"innocent" title hid its real intent to open patient safety reviews and quality assurance efforts to
trial lawyers for purposes of lawsuits. See Joseph D. Portoghese, The Hidden Agenda of
Amendment 7: Other Views - My Word, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Oct. 19, 2004, available at
http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2004-10-19/news/0410190160_ lpatient-care-medical-staff-

amendment-7.
97. See Thomas, supra note 75.
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Florida journalists overwhelmingly
recommended that Floridians vote
"no" on all three Amendments. 98
Over $27.3 million in contributions were made to FPP to support its
efforts in the 2004 election. 99 Almost all of it came from AFTL, Florida
plaintiff malpractice lawyers, and their law firms.' 00 By comparison,
former Florida governor Charlie Crist only raised $24.2 million in his
winning 2006 gubernatorial campaign. 10 ' Not surprisingly, On November
2, 2004, Florida voters passed all three amendments' 0032 Amendment 7
received over 5.8 million votes in favor of its passage. 1
IV. A CONSUMER PROTECTION AND INFORMATION TOOL?
Winston Churchill is often credited with the adage, "history is written
by the victors."' 0 4 Not surprisingly, some Florida plaintiffs' lawyers have
lived up to base expectations and have employed self-serving revisionist
histories surrounding the intent behind the passage of Amendment 7.
They have promoted a characterization that prior to the passages of
Amendment 7, Floridians collectively held a "long-simmering frustration
over a perceived 'protect our own' mentality perpetuated by the medical
profession's effort's to shield from
public scrutiny even the most
10 5
dangerous doctors and hospitals."'

98. See id.; Power Plays Unwelcome, supra note 81; Vote No on 3 Medical Issues, SuN
SENTINEL (Fla.), Oct. 24 2004, http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2004-10-24/news/0410211157
1 malpractice-award-medical-malpractice-malpractice-reforms; Fuchsia, Our Position:Only 2 of
8 ConstitutionalAmendments Deserve Voter Support, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Oct. 17 2004, http://
articles.orlandosentinel.com/2004-10-17/news/0410160036_1_constitutional-amendments-flori
da-constitution-florida-constitution.
99. FLA. DIv. OF ELEC., Floridiansfor Patient Protection, at 1, available at Campaign
Finance Activity, http://election.dos.state.fl.us/cgi-bin/contrib.exe (last visited Sept. 19, 2014).
100. See id.
101. Names in the News: Charlie Crist vs. Marco Rubio, NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON MONEY
IN STATE POLITICS, http://classic.followthemoney.org//press/ReportView.phtml?r=392&ext(last visited Sept. 19, 2014).
102. Amendment 3 received 63.58% of votes cast, Amendment 7 received 81.16% and
Amendment 8 received 71.081%. See Florida 2004 Ballot Measures, BALLOTPEDIA,
http://ballotpedia.org/Florida_2004_ballot-measures (last visited Sep. 19, 2014).
103. Id.
104. Jill Wagner, FindingaRoadmap to Teach Kids about Mideast Study Examines History
Textbooks for Israelis, Palestinians, NBC NEWS, Fri., May 6, 2005, available at
http://www.msnbc.ms.com/id/7759863.
105. J.B. Harris, Riding the Red Rocket: Amendment 7 and the End of DiscoveryImmunity
of Adverse Medical Incidents in the State of Florida,83 FLA. B.J. 20, 20 (2009), available at
http://www.floridabar.org/DIVCOM/JN/JNJoumal01.nsf/8c9f13012b96736985256aa90062482
9/258fdd31c33e3cda85257567006b3148?OpenDocument. It is notable that while Mr. Harris'
article provides ample citation to much what is asserted, his contention that Amendment 7's
passage symbolized the public's long term dissatisfaction with peer review privileges carries no
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But as has been attributed to four-term U.S. Senator Daniel Patrick
Moynihan, "everyone is entitled to his own opinion, but not his own
facts." 1°6 There is simply no citable evidence that prior to Amendment 7,
Florida's peer review system was subject to any sort of reform effort lead
by citizen groups. While a number of commenters legitimately criticize
the efficacy of peer review (and in some cases severely), 10 7 authentic peer
review critics have not been inclined to portray the passage of
Amendment 7 in such simplistic and erroneous terms. 10 8 The tragedy of
these distortions is that once they are printed, like a false rumor, they are
perpetuated by others.
Take for example a 2013 law journal article that states: "Amendment
7's passage came to symbolize the public's long-standing frustration over
a perceived 'protect our own' mentality that shielded from public scrutiny
even the most dangerous doctors and hospitals."' 1 9 This is almost a direct
quote from the article cited in the previous paragraph, which was
authored by a Florida trial lawyer post-passage of Amendment 7 that
carries no citation. 1 0 Maybe credit should be given those plaintiff trial
lawyers who have made token attempts at being intellectually honest with
opens the door to that kind of public
comments like "[The Buster case] ...
dissemination which may result in turning what was initially intended as
a retaliatory amendment into the greatest public service that trial lawyers
have ever performed.""'1
Perhaps the most ignoble and harmful byproduct of the makeover of
AFTL's original retaliatory intent behind Amendment 7 has been a
uniform presumption that it is utilized by patients to better determine
from whom they should seek health care and evaluate the quality and
fitness of health care providers currently rendering service to them. 1 2
citation. Id.
106. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, WIKIQUOTE, http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/DanielPatrickMoynihan (last updated May 3, 2014).
107. See Yann H.H. van Geertruyden, The Fox Guarding the Henhouse: How the Health
Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 and State Peer Review ProtectionsStatutes Have Helped
Protect Bad FaithPeer Review in the Medical Community, 18 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L & POL'Y

239, 252-53 (2001). "While it is important to keep the peer review proceeding confidential in
civil trials involving malpractice claims, physicians should have the right to inspect and offer
evidence of bad faith discovered at the peer review proceedings." Id. at 268.
108. See Statement of Joanne Doroshow Executive Dir., Ctr. for Justice & Democracy,
before the Governor's Select Task Force on HealthcareProfessionalLiability Insurance,(Oct.
21, 2002), availableat centerjd.org/system/files/FloridaTestimony.pdf.
109. Brendan A. Sorg, Is Meaningful PeerReview HeadedBack to Florida?,46 AKRON L.

REV. 799, .814 (2013).
110. See Harris, supra note 105, at 20.
111. Ted Babbitt, Patient'sRight to Know, BABBITT, JOHNSON, OSBORNE, & LE CLAINCHE,
P.A., availableat http://www.babbitt-johnson.com/2009/January-2009.pdf.
112. See Robert C. Weill, Buster andthe ContinuingSaga over the Patients'Right-to-KnowAbout-Medical-Incidents-Amendment,28 TRIAL ADVOC. Q. 14, 14 (2009).
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Before it reached the ballot, Amendment 7 was craftily veiled as a
consumer information tool.113 During the Florida Supreme Court's
advisory opinion review for single-subject, ballot title, and summary
standards, 114 lawyers for Floridians for Patient Protection argue that,
combined with the title, "Patients' Right to Know About Adverse
Medical Incidents," Amendment 7's summary made it clear that the
amendment was referring to "consumer information."11 5 FFP
representatives echoed this invented intent during the campaign, claiming
that knowledge gained under Amendment 7 would be used to choose the
best doctors and hospitals: "We can find out the reputation of our hair
dressers or auto mechanics but not our doctors. It's ludicrous for
something as important as your health care." 1 6 After the amendment's
passage, the Florida Supreme Court unfortunately endorsed the consumer
information tool pretense of the Amendment in its Buster decision:
While we have differed in some respects with the opinion of the
Fifth District in Buster, we cannot improve upon Judge Sawaya's
concluding comments:
We believe that Amendment 7 heralds a change in the public
policy of this state to lift the shroud of privilege and
confidentiality in order to foster disclosure of information that
will allow patients to better determine from whom they should
seek health care, evaluate the quality and fitness of health care
providers currently rendering service to them, and allow them
access to information gathered through the self-policing
processes during the discovery period of litigation filed by
injured patients or the estates of deceased patients against their
health care providers. 117
Post-passage, this quote was seized upon and expanded by the
plaintiffs bar. AFTL lawyers claimed that doctors were "hiding behind
peer review to protect each other and that the public should have access
to information about a hospital's track record with infection rates, adverse
incidents, and other mistakes in order to make an informed decision about
113. Id.
114. FLA. STAT. § 101.161(1) (2014); see generallyFLA. CONST. art. II, § 3.
115. Mark D. Killian, Academy, FMA Square off over Amendments, FLA. B. NEWS, July 1,
2004, at 2; Laura V. Yaeger, Amendment 7: Medical Tradition v. The Will of the People: Has
Florida'sPeer Review PrivilegeVanished?, 13 MICH. ST. U.J. MED. & L. 123, 127 (2009).

116. Cherie Black, PatientCouldExamine Docs, FLA. TIMEs-UNION, Oct. 29, 2004 (quoting
Melinda Hause, a board member of FPP), http://jacksonville.com/tu-online/stories/1 02904/met_
17046452.shtml.
117. Fla. Hosp. Waterman, Inc. v. Buster, 984 So. 2d 478, 494 (Fla. 2008) (quoting Fla.
Hosp. Waterman, Inc. v. Buster, 932 So. 2d 344, 355-56 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006)).
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where to seek medical care." 11 8 FPP/AFTL lawyers have continued to
claim that Amendment 7 was designed to allow prospective patients to
have "all the information available" about a physician's qualifications or
competence before being treated." 9 Plaintiffs attorney Sean Domnick,
who handled the Buster case for the plaintiffs at the trial level and argued
the appeal before the Florida Supreme Court has been quoted as saying
"people want to [have control] and they're entitled to have control over
their own health care decision-making."' 20 Furthermore, he stated "but
you can't make a decision [about health care] if you don't have the
information." 121 AFTL successor organization the Florida Justice
Association president Frank Petosa, has said when discussing
Amendment 7 that selecting a doctor can be a life-or-death decision, so
mistakes. "It should
patients should know if their physician has made past
'1 22
not be swept under the rug in a cloud of secrecy."
V. Do PATIENTS KNOW (OR CARE) ABOUT "A PATIENT'S RIGHT TO
KNOw"? A HOSPITAL RISK MANAGERS SURVEY
Although the plaintiffs' bar consistently cites to the number of
Floridians who voted for Amendment 7 as proof of the Amendment's
popularity, after leaving the voting booth, the general public quickly took
no further notice of "a patient's right to know" as disputes over its scope
and the subsequent implementing statute worked their way through the
court system. 23 Reflecting the true intent of Amendment 7, it is
illuminating to note that it contains no provision requiring notification to
24
patients of the existence of their right to query about adverse incidents.'
Unsurprisingly, there is no record of any of the parties involved in
Amendment 7's passage taking up the cause of informing patients of their
"right to know." It is well understood by those responsible for responding
to Amendment 7 requests that the Amendment has not been used for
118.

Liz Freeman, Voters OK Trio of Medical Malpractice Amendments, NAPLES NEWS,

Nov. 10, 2004 (on file with author).
119. See Coombs, supra note 16, at 394-95, 419; Babbitt, supra note 111.
120. Stephan Stock, I-Team: Ignoring Patients' Right to Know, CBS4 Miami (May 23,
2011, 10:52AM) (quoting Sean Domnick, plaintiffs trial lawyer in the Buster case),
http://miami.cbslocal.com/2011/05/23/i-team-ignoring-patients-right-to-know/.
121.
122.

Id.
Bill Kaczor, Hospitals Lose Florida Court Fight Against Patients' Right to Know,

DAILY REP. (Mar. 7, 2008) (quoting Florida Justice Association President, Frank Betosa),
http://www.dailyreportonline.com/id=1202552309564/Hospitals-lose-Florida-court-fight-agains
t-patients'-right-to-know?slretum=20140414141807#ixzz2zFULYKyj.
123.

Liz Freeman, Resolving 'Right to Know' Will Take Time, NAPLES DAILY NEWS (July 3,

2006, 12:02AM), http://www.naplesnews.com/news/local-news/supreme-court
ts rightknow.
124. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 22.

untangle_patien
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However, there has been no data

to authenticate this supposition or what the Amendment has cost in terms
of time and legal expense. To better understand what is precipitating
Amendment 7 requests, in July 2013, as a part of this Article, we prepared
and conducted a survey of licensed Florida risk managers of the 218 acute
care hospitals in Florida.' 26 Under Florida law, hospitals are required to
maintain an internal risk management program that includes the retention
of a licensed risk manager who is responsible for implementation and
oversight of the facility's risk management program.' 27 Our findings
provided many insights into the consequences of Amendment 7 and speak
to its lack of meaningful benefits and negative fallout.
A. Populationand Survey Sample
An alphabetical listing of acute care hospitals was obtained from the
Florida Agency for Health Care Administration (FAHCA). 128 This list
was cross-referenced with a list of licensed risk managers in the State of
Florida from the Florida Society for Healthcare Risk Management and
Patient Safety (FSHRMPS) to match which risk managers represented
which acute care hospitals.129 The Board of Directors of FSHRMPS was
contacted about this survey and gave their support of the project. 3
A total of 182 e-surveys were sent to hospital risk managers which
enjoyed 45.6% response rate, encompassing a total of 83 facilities, or
38% of acute care facilities in Florida.'31 Our survey has a 95% level of
certainty with a margin of error of +/- 7.96%. Twenty-seven Florida
counties were represented in the sample population, and they
were evenly
32
state.'
the
across
regions
geographic
all
across
distributed
B. Survey Methodology andApproach
Phone calls were made to each facility risk manager to confirm the
correct individual was responding for the facility and to explain the
purpose of the Amendment 7 e-survey project. Risk managers were
125.

See Coombs, supra note 16, at 395; James C. Sawran & Robert C. Weill, Amendment

7: Will the Patient's Right to Know Come at Too High a Price?, 24 TRIAL ADVOC. Q. 7, 9

(2005).
126. Hospital Beds and Services List, FLA. AG. FOR HEALTH CARE ADMIN. (July 2013),
available at http://ahca.myflorida.com/MCHQ/CONFA/Publications/docs/HospBedSrvListlJul
2013_HospitalBedsandServicesList.pdf.
127. FLA. STAT. § 395.0197(1)-(2) (2007).

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

FAHCA Acute Care Hospital List (on file with authors).
FSHRMPS Licensed Risk Manager List (on file with authors).
FSHRMPS Board of Directors Interviews (transcripts on file with authors).
Hospital Risk Manager E-Survey Results (on file with authors).
Id. (on file with authors).
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informed that their names would be kept confidential and that deidentified aggregate data would be shared with the FSHRMPS
membership upon completion of the study. The e-survey was designed
with simplicity in mind and consisted of 13 short multiple-choice
questions and one narrative comment question.133 Three follow-up
notices were sent to those who did not respond within ten days of the esurvey being sent and a separate thank-you was sent to all participants.
Survey Findings and Analysis
Respondents reported receiving a total of 767 Amendment 7 requests
between 2004 and 2013. The survey results indicated that 88% (+/- 5.2%)
of respondents had received at least one Amendment 7 request from 2004
to 2013, while 79% (+/- 6.5%) of respondents have received Amendment
7 requests every year since the passage of Amendment 7 in 2004. The
majority of respondents (79% (+/- 6.5%)) indicated they received
between 1 and 9 requests per year. Some respondents in counties with
large populations (such as Miami-Dade) reported receiving more than ten
Amendment 7 requests per year.
An overwhelming 98.04% (+/- 2.2%) of respondents reported that all
(100%) of their Amendment 7 requests stemmed from or resulted in
litigation. When this response is coupled with the reported 8 to 40+ work
hours that 84% (+/- 5.8%) of respondents indicated are required to
respond to a single request, the impact Amendment 7 has had on Florida
hospital workforces and budgets comes into focus. As an example, one
hospital in a small Florida county indicated receiving 25 Amendment 7
requests requiring 8-16 hours each in response time of 200 to 400 hours
total. Another cost to facilities is increased legal defense fees. For
example, 86% (+/- 5.5) of respondents routinely engage outside legal
counsel in responding to Amendment 7 requests.

133.

Id. (on file with authors).
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FIGURE I:AVERAGE WORK HOURS REQUIRED TO RESPOND TO A SINGLE
AMENDMENT 7 REQUEST
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Less than one percent (0.98% (+/- 1.6%)) of Amendment 7 requests
received by respondents are reported to have come from prospective
patients interested in selecting prospective health care services.134 An
equally low number (0.98% (+/- 1.6)) of requests were from patients
135
interested in health care services they were currently receiving.
Responses to these questions (Questions 7 and 8) were cross-referenced
with the final narrative question, which asks "Do you think that
Amendment 7 is being used by patients to make informed health care
decisions? Please provide your thoughts on whether patients are using
Amendment 7 requests to make decisions on prospective or current health
care treatment at your facility." Of the three respondents who answered
134. Id (on file with authors).
135. Id. (on file with authos).
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they had received requests from patients interested in selecting
prospective health care services or who are interested in health care
services they are currently receiving, we received the following responses
to the final narrative question:
"In my opinion, I do not think that patients are using amendment 7
requests to make decisions on prospective or current health care
treatment, most if not all requests using Amendment 7 comes from
attorney offices on behalf of patients with litigation in mind."
"It's only a tool for plaintiff attorneys."
When the law first passed, we did have a few phone calls requesting
their adverse incident reports. We have not seen this since. I do not feel
Amendment 7 is being used by patients to make informed health care
decisions. This would include prospective or current health care
36
treatment. Every NOI we currently get has an Amendment 7 request.1

136. NOI = Notice of intent to initiate litigation. In Florida, prior to filing a complaint for
medical negligence, a claimant is required to notify each prospective defendant of their intent to
initiate litigation. FLA. STAT. § 766.106(2)(a) (2013). These Notices of Intent are generally
accompanied by informal discovery requests. A failure to respond by a prospective defendant "is
grounds for dismissal of claims or defenses ultimately asserted." FLA. STAT. § 766.106(2)(a)
(2013).
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Table 1: Do you think Amendment 7 is being used by patients
to make informed health care decisions?
* My experience to date with Amendment 7 requests have all been generated by plaintiffs counsel, not by patients.
* Itis only a tool for plaintiff attorneys.
* I have never received an Amendment 7 request from anyone other than a malpractice lawyer.
* No, but mostly because consumers are not aware of the Amendment.
• All requests for Amendment 7 is submitted by plaintiff attorneys, a lot of time and effort go into attempting to keep attorneys
from having access to hospital data, incident reports other than the identified patient's and root cause analyses. Time and
effort of having depositions of risk managers, hospital administrators, medical staff services and actual team members.
* My experience has been with plaintiff attorneys seeking this information. Their demands/requests have been time
consuming and has not identified any benefit to support their claim.
No. Patients use the data from the various databases that are available (i.e. Hospital Compare, ISMP, MyFlorida and others)
on which to base their decisions for where to receive their healthcare. The content within any items related to Amendment 7
requests are so sketchy or bland as to be rather nebulous. This data is also not compared using common denominators with
other like organizations making It more anecdotal Innature than something that is useful.
* It is being used by ambulance chasing lawyers to inflate and dramatize their demands.
* Absolutely not. The only requests we receive are attorney requests, most plaintiff attorneys who are filing legal action against
us or preparing to file. The current Amendment 7 needs to be removed.
* Not being used to make informed health care decisions. Only requests is from attorneys.
* Amendment 7 Information is used for litigation purposes, the request is 100% plaintiff counsel.
* At this time, no patient in our area has made a request to our hospital for records related to Amendment 7.
* No. It is being used by plaintiff attorneys.
Inmy opinion, I do not think that patients are using Amendment 7 requests to make decisions on prospective or current
health care treatment. Most if not all requests using Amendment 7 come from attorney offices on behalf of patient with
litigation in mind.
• Patients are not using Amendment 7 to make decision on prospective or current health care treatment.

V1. TEN YEARS OF AMENDMENT 7
After a decade of reflection, the ballot initiative battles of 2004 caused
by the physician versus attorney feud were an unquestionable fiasco for
health care in Florida. The millions of dollars the FMA spent were
essentially wasted as Amendment 3 fell victim to its own wording. Rather
than stating a direct cap on attorney's fees, Amendment 3 was written as
"claimant's right to fair compensation" that sets the percentage of
recovery a claimant is entitled to receive. 137 Post-enactment, Amendment
3 was determined by the Florida Supreme Court to create a personal right,
which directly benefited the medical malpractice claimant and, like other
137.. FLA. CONST. art. I,

§ 26.
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fundamental constitutional rights, could be fully waived. 138 Trial lawyers
have stated they were "more clever than their physician counterparts" and
found a way to "circumvent" the medical establishment's amendment,
which some characterized as physicians' "attempts at insulating
themselves from medical malpractice lawsuits."' 39 According to the
AFTL's leadership, Amendment 3 is easily sidestepped by having clients
sign waivers of their Amendment 3 rights, which happens on a regular
140
basis, resulting in no real loss of business to the Plaintiffs bar.
Curiously, and perhaps tellingly, this option for sidestepping Amendment
3 was openly being discussed by plaintiff attorneys the day after
Amendment 3 passed.141 If AFTL had truly been "clever" and thought of
this work-around before the election, it begs the question as to why its
members bothered to fight Amendment 3 at all and why their retaliatory
initiatives were necessary.
While the loss of any true efficacy from the passage of Amendment 3
was another in a long line of ballot initiative missteps on the part of the
FMA, its direct consequence, the passage of the retaliatory Amendment
7, has been a far greater cause of detriment to health care and patient
safety in Florida. Along with the infamous "Pregnant Pig" and "Bullet
Train" amendments, 142 Amendment 7 has become an exemplification of
43
the shortcomings of Florida's often criticized ballot initiative process'
due to the way it practically bypassed of all three branches of government
to allow the immediate elimination of decades-long statutory peer review
privileges overnight, with nothing but the broadest language to initially
aid in interpreting its vague parameters. 144 Amendment 7's passage did
138. See Comments and Objections to Proposed Amendment to Rules of Professional
Conduct by Floridians for Patient Protection, Inc. at 11, In re Pet. to Amend Rules Regulating the
Florida Bar, Rule 4-1.5(f)(4)(B) of the Rules of Professional Conduct (2005) (No. SC05-1150),
availableat http://www.law.fsu.edu/library/flsupct/sc05-1150/05-1150patientprotection.pdf.
139. Ted Babbitt, Doctors Still Fighting Disclosure, BABBITT, JOHNSON, OSBORNE & LE
CLAINCHE, P.A., http://www.babbitt-johnson.com/2009/September-2009.pdf. See also Babbitt,
supra note I11.
140. See Coombs, supra note 16, at 391.
141. Florida Doctors, Lawyers at Odds Over Effects of MalpracticeAmendments, INS. J.,

Nov. 5, 2004, http://www.insurancejoumal.com/news/southeast/2004/11/05/47480.htm

(last

visited Sept. 28, 2014).

142. The amendment makes it unlawful for "any person to confine a pig during pregnancy
in an enclosure, or to tether a pig during pregnancy, on a farm in such a way that she is prevented
from turning around freely." Florida Animal Cruelty, Amendment 10 (2002), BALLOTPEDIA,
http://ballotpedia.org/FloridaAnimalCruelty,Amendment_10_(2002) (last visited May 14,
2014). See also Bill Kaczor, Fla. Pregnant Pig Amendment has Lasting Legacy, FLA. TIMESUNION, Oct. 31 2008, available at http://jacksonville.com/apnews/stories/103108/D945D9T00.

shtml.
143.

Id.

144. See generally Edward J. Carbone, Discoverability of Records of Adverse Medical
Incidents, LEXOLOGY (June 10, 2013), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=a9l2cd
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nothing to alter the fact that peer review, credentialing, event
investigations, quality assurance, and risk management activities are still
very much required of Florida hospitals and health care providers by
various statutes. 145 And while it may be impossible to maintain a precise
count, between 2004 and 2014, there have been thousands of Amendment
7 discovery requests to Florida physicians, hospitals, and care
providers. 146 The resulting turmoil left Florida health care providers
seeking direction on what records were discoverable, who can request
records, and what the process should be for identifying and producing the
records. 147 Virtually every meaningful attempt over the past ten years to
either legislatively or judicially place Amendment 7 into a workable
context for Florida hospitals and health care providers in light of their
mandatory federal and state obligations to maintain peer review and
procedures and systems for risk management, quality improvement, and
patient safety has been found to violate the comprehensive rights granted
under the amendment.148 For a telling example of one of the unforeseen
d5-b27d-482a-966 I-2acdb55c22f6.
145.

FLA. STAT. § 395.0191(8) (2006); FLA. STAT. §§ 395.0193(7)-(8) (2007); FLA. STAT.

§§ 395.0197(6)(c)(7), (9), (11) (2007); FLA. STAT. § 766.101(5) (2014); FLA. STAT. § 766.1016(2)
(2003). See The Amendment 7 Challenge: Is a PSO Hype or Hope?, FOLEY & LARDNER, LLP
(Apr. 29, 2008), http://www.foley.com/the-amendment-7-challenge-is-a-pso-hype-or-hope/
[hereinafter The Amendment 7 Challenge].
146. The Florida Hospital Association by 2008 was found to have received 400 Amendment
7 requests alone. See Florida Hosp. Assoc. v. Viamonte, No. 4:08cv312-RH/WCS, 2008 WL
5101755, at *2 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 26, 2008).
147. Sharon Roberts, What Remains of Peer Review After Amendment 7?, S. FLA. HOsp.
NEWS (July 2010), available at http://southfloridahospitalnews.com/pageWhatRemains_
of Peer Review After Amendment 7/5608/1l/.
148. See FLA. STAT. § 381.028 (2013) (enabling statute for Amendment 7); see also W. Fla.
Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. See, 79 So. 3d 1, 11-13 (Fla. 2012) (holding that FLA. STAT. §
381.028(7)(b)(1) (2013) unconstitutionally limits Amendment 7 and that the Health Care Quality
and Improvement Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. § 11101(2) (1997) does not federally preempt
Amendment 7); Buster, 984 So. 2d at 490 (holding that the Legislature's interpretation of
Amendment 7's intent when crafting FLA. STAT. § 381.028 (2007) was too restrictive, although
the statute itself did not extend so far as to be unconstitutional). However, the Court further held
that because Amendment 7 applies retroactively and is presumptively self-executing, it preempts
longstanding immunity and privileges. FLA. STAT. §§ 395.0191(8) (2006), 395.0193(8) (2007),
766.101(5), 766.1016(2) (2003); Bartow HMA, LLC v. Kirkland, 126 So. 3d 1247, 1252-53 (Fla.
2d DCA 2013) (holding that Amendment 7 trumps applicable statutory discovery protections to
the extent documents relate to adverse medical incident reporting); Columbia Hosp. Corp. of S.
Broward v. Fain, 16 So. 3d 236, 240-41 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (holding that Amendment 7 does
not exclude discovery requests that are irrelevant, overbroad, or burdensome); Fla. Eye Clinic,
P.A. v. Gmach, 14 So. 3d 1044, 1050 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009) (denying petition for certiorari for
review on motion to compel discovery of certain reports on the grounds that Amendment 7
precludes any fact-based work product privilege); Lifemark Hosps. of Fla., Inc. v. Herrera, 981
So. 2d 527, 527 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (holding that Amendment 7 applies retroactively); Amisub
N. Ridge Hosp. Inc. v. Sonaglia, 995 So. 2d 999, 1001 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (extending
Amendment 7 to cover a nonparty's peer review records); Morton Plant Hosp. Ass'n, Inc. v.
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consequences of Amendment 7 and the upheaval it caused, one need look
no further than then-Florida Supreme Court Justice Charles T. Wells'
dissent in the landmark Amendment 7 case FloridaHospital Waterman
v. Buster.149 Here, Justice Wells decries the majority's decision that the
amendment is to be applied retroactively and thereby encompasses
existing records created under the belief they were non-discoverable:
I conclude that the majority's decision is contrary to the law and
fundamental fairness. I specifically reject the majority's and the
First District's conclusion that the statute, which for over twenty
years has protected hospitals' statutorily mandated peer review as
part of medical quality assurance, did not establish vested rights
that the investigations, proceedings, and records of peer review
panels were "not subject to discovery" and could not be introduced
into evidence in civil actions. § 395.0193(8), Fla. Stat. (2002).
Furthermore, to allow discovery of peer review records containing
statements by those who had a right to rely upon the statute's
promise that the records would not be discovered or introduced in
a civil action is not only legally unsupportable but is fundamentally
made based upon the
unfair and puts into jeopardy all statements
50
promise of any statutory privilege.1
Suggestions to providers on how to function under Amendment 7 have
ranged from replacing the existing peer review rating structures with
narrative-based peer review systems,' 51 to involving outside counsel or
general counsel in sensitive peer review discussions in order to invoke
opinion work product and attorney-client privileges. 152 Another
Shahbas ex rel Shahbas, 960 So. 2d 820, 827 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (holding that patient was entitled
to adverse medical records under Amendment 7 regardless of whether they were relevant to
pending litigation).
149. See Buster, 984 So. 2d at 494-503.
150. Id. at 495.
151. See generally Peer Review Since ConstitutionalAmendment 7 Passed, BENEDICT AND
AssocIATES, INC., (June 6, 2006) http://benedictriskmanagement.com/download-central and
http://benedictriskmanagement.com/filedownload/41/Peer-review 06062006.pdf.
152. Id at 2. Using these evidentiary privileges has its shortcomings. Attorney-client
privilege can be deemed waived due to disclosures to third parties such as insurers or regulators.
Arguments can be made that the materials in question were not made in anticipation of litigation
or at the behest of counsel, or that counsel was acting in business or compliance capacity rather
than in a litigation capacity. See Katherine Mikk, Making the Plaintiffs Bar Earn Its Keep:
Rethinking the Hospital Incident Report, 53 N.Y.L. SCH. L.R. 133, 140-42 (2008-09). "Fact"
work product privilege or protections from discovery of any factual information gathered or
prepared in connection with a case has been held to be abrogated by the passage of Amendment
7. See Fla.Eye Clinic, 14 So. 3d at 1049. Records prepared in anticipation of litigation that are
prepared by clients, at least in part, to assist lawyers are subject to Amendment 7 production. See
Lakeland Reg'I Med. Ctr. v. Neely, 8 So.3d 1268,1270 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009); Acevedo v. Doctors
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challenge when responding to an Amendment 7 discovery request has
been the breadth of potential documents subject to a request given that
153
providers do not maintain uniform "adverse medical incident" files.
Simply determining where to look for responsive documents has been a
costly and time-consuming enterprise. Although the Florida Supreme
Court in Buster struck down the majority of the attempted boundaries the
Florida Legislature sought to create in the wake of Amendment 7 with
the passage of the enabling legislation, section 381.028(7)(c) of the
statute was found not to conflict with the language of the Amendment
and was left intact. 154 This section allows providers to request payment
for the reasonable cost of compliance with a request, including charges
for staff time utilized while conducting a search for documents and any
redaction required. 155 Providers have been advised either to file a cost
affidavit with the court to limit the scope of the request and seek an
party and negotiate a
advance payment 56 or to contact the requesting
15 7
narrowing of the request in light of the costs.
In modest numbers, some Florida providers have either joined or
established Patient Safety Organizations (PSOs) seeking federallycreated disclosure protections over their peer review and patient safety
documents. 58 The Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act (PSQIA)
was signed into law on May 5, 2005, less than a year after Amendment
7's passage.' 59 The Act established federal "Patient Safety Work
Product" (PSWP) protections for information assembled or created by
providers for purposes of reporting to a PSO or that are developed by the
PSO in order to conduct patient safety activities.' 60 Providers who are
Hosp., Inc., 68 So. 3d 949, 953 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011).

153.

See Sawran & Weill, supra note 125, at 13.

154.

Buster, 984 So. 2d at 494.
FLA. STAT. § 381.028(7)(c) (2005).

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Weill, supra note 112, at 21.
See Carbone, supranote 144.
See The Amendment 7 Challenge, supra note 145.
See Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act, 42 C.F.R. § 3.10 (2010).
42 U.S.C. § 299b-21(7) (2005); 42 C.F.R. § 3.20 (2010). The Act defines PSWP as

any:
[D]ata, reports, records, memoranda, analyses (such as root cause analyses), or
written or oral statements (or copies of any of this material)
(i) Which could improve patient safety, health care quality, or health care
outcomes; and
(A) Which are assembled or developed by a provider for reporting to a PSO and
are reported to a PSO ....
(B)Are developed by a PSO for the conduct of patient safety activities; or
(ii) Which identify or constitute the deliberations or analysis of, or identify the
fact of reporting pursuant to, a patient safety evaluation system.
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members of PSOs submit information to their Patient Safety Evaluation
Systems (PSES) for reporting to their PSO. 16 1 As a result, this peer review
information is not subject to discovery, nor is it admissible as evidence
in federal, state civil, criminal, administrative, or disciplinary board
proceedings against providers.' 62 As the negative Amendment 7 case law
started to mount, suggested tactical use of PSO protections to
countermand effects of Amendment 7 was being discussed. 163 Florida law
firms who represent providers have conducted seminars and issued
practice updates on the utilization of PSOs toward this end.' 64 These
conversations were contemporaneous with the listing of "Florida Patient
Safety Corporation," the first PSO authorized by the Department of
Health and Human Services on November 5, 2008.165
CONCLUSION

While this Article has focused on how the doctor/lawyer feud
produced Amendment 7 and how it has subsequently been
misrepresented and tactically employed by the plaintiff s bar, the greatest
"adverse incident" has been on patient safety. It has been estimated that
210,000 to 400,000 patients die annually in U.S. hospitals as a result of
medical errors. 166 According to Department of Health and Human
Services studies, hospitals rely heavily on self-regulating systems such as
incident reporting systems to find safety problems and gain information
used to improve patient safety.' 67 Reports from staff directly involved
42 C.F.R. § 3.20 (2010). This definition does not include medical records or billing and discharge
information. Id. Additionally, information that is subject to mandatory state reporting is not
protected under the PSQIA, see 42 U.S.C. § 299b-21(7)(B) (2005).
161. 42 U.S.C. § 299b-21(7)(B) (2005).
162. 42 C.F.R. § 3.204(a) (2009).
163. See The Amendment 7 Challenge, supranote 145.
164. See Edward Carbone, Medical Malpractice Update - Spring 2013, JD SUPRA Bus.
ADVISOR, http://www.jdsupra.com/postlcontentViewerEmbed.aspx?fid=O1 79f761 -f963-4cb6-b9
12-5aecea46df26 (last visited Sept. 28, 2014); see also Edward Carbone et al., Presents An
Antidote to Amendment 7? How Patient Safety Organizations May Be Able to Help Florida
Health Care Providers Protect Risk Management and Peer Review Materials at the 18th Annual
Florida Liability Claims Conference (June 5, 2014) (presenting information about patient safety
organizations and Amendment 7 for conference for defense lawyers and insurance specialists)
(conference schedule availableat http://fdla.org/pdfs/2014%20FLCC%20%20Brochure.pdf).
165. • This PSO voluntarily relinquished its certification with HHR on April 1st 2010.
According AHRQ records, four Florida PSOs have voluntarily delisted. Delisted PatientSafety
Organizations, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH & QUALITY, http://www.pso.ahrq.gov/
listed/delisted (last visited May 14, 2014).
166. John T. James, A New Evidence-Based Estimate of Patient Harms Associated with
HospitalCare,9 J. PATIENT SAFETY 122, 122-28 (2013).
167. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEP'T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., OEI-06-0900091, HOSPITAL INCIDENT REPORTING SYSTEMS Do NOT CAPTURE MOST PATIENT HARM (Jan.
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with patient safety events "provide greater detail and insight about the
patient, circumstances, and possible contributing factors (such as specific
breakdowns in processes) than information provided by other event
detection methods."' 68 These reports have the added benefit of focusing
staff attention on patient safety issues.169 Strengthening hospital reporting
systems and practices was cited by Centers for Medicare & Medicaid
Services (CMS) as "essential" to patient harm prevention.' 70 However,
physicians have been found to under-utilize reporting systems, in part due
to fear of liability and malpractice suits.' 7 1 A national survey of
physicians found that, of those with direct personal knowledge of a
serious medical error, 46% did not report the error on at least one
occasion. 172 Additional research has revealed that 76% of doctors state
concerns that medical malpractice lawsuits are detrimental to their
providing care to patients. 173 With roughly 1 in 14 U.S. doctors facing a
malpractice suit every year, physician concerns may not be that
unwarranted. 174 While it is axiomatic that meaningful progress in the field
of patient safety will not occur without more effective data analysis from
systems that are capturing most adverse patient incidents and the specific
contributing facts in which they occur, Amendment 7 has created a
system where health care providers are required to document and selfreport errors which could directly be used against them in a lawsuit. It is
therefore equally axiomatic that progress on patient safety is being
severely compromised by the doctor/lawyer feud and, particularly, by
Amendment 7. As one Florida doctor stated post-Amendment 7's
passage, "I'm afraid if I say constructive [in a peer review setting], it
could be taken out of context by a plaintiff attorney, so I'm not going to
render any opinion."' 75 One overriding theme of the patient-safety
2012), at 1.
168.

Id. at 11.

169. Id.
170. Id. Executive Summary iv.
171. Ethan J. Rowin et al., Does Error and Adverse Event Reporting by Physicians and
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movement has been transparency. 76 It has been said that "only through
transparency into the occurrence and causes of patient harm can we hope
to make substantial medical safety improvement," yet "antagonism and
distrust between doctors and lawyers, much of it generated by the current
tort system, blocks the road toward transparency.' 77 Unfortunately, the
courts in Florida have essentially taken the position that "[iut is not for us
to judge the wisdom of the constitutional amendments enacted or the
change in public policy pronounced through those amendments, even in
instances where the change involves abrogation of long-standing
legislation that establishes and promotes an equally or arguably more
compelling public policy."' 178 Therefore, it would appear that the only
potential avenues to effect meaningful change regarding Amendment 7
would be for either the Florida Legislature to propose an amendment to
repealing Amendment 7,179 or for Congress to enact federal legislation
that would preempt state law. While the Florida Constitution allows the
Florida State Legislature to put a proposed amendment on the ballot, 60%
or more of the legislators in the House of Representatives and the Senate
must agree to do so in a joint resolution.' 8 Given the level of reported
influence that plaintiff trial lawyers wield in the Florida Senate, getting a
supermajority seems unlikely.18 1 However, some commenters have
suggested the time may be opportune for federal legislation, either by
amending the PSQIA to expressly state that it provides federal privilege
and immunity surrounding peer review, credentialing, event
investigations, quality assurance, and risk management,182 or by a
"brokered" deal between health care system reformers and doctors to pass
new federal legislation that both limits malpractice liability and
concurrently reforms fee-for-service payment while improving
transparency.183 By exchanging real federal malpractice reform capping
non-economic damages that does not lead to inequitable results for
injured patients for cost savings, physicians and other health care
176. See McClurg, supra note 6, at 330.
177. Id.at 367.
178. Buster, 984 So. 2d at 480. (The quoted language was used by the Supreme Court from
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providers are likely to be more at ease disclosing errors, making apologies
to patients, and mediating disputes to avoid litigation. 184 However, as the
endless political maneuvering over the Affordable Care Act has
demonstrated, changing the nation's health care system is next to
impossible, and trial lawyers' lobbyists will undoubtedly fight any efforts
limiting non-economic damages. 185 Combining the need for liability
reform in a way that furthers patient safety, rather than detracts from it,
as is the case with Amendment 7, will not be simple, but is a required
result. The alternative is another decade or more of the doctor/lawyer
feuding with patient safety as the casualty.
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